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Abstract
The Mixed Economy had its origins in the Great Depression. This
disastrous decline resulted from a conjuncture of cycles in the compo-
nents of real investment, aggravated by financial developments.
President Roosevelt, dealing with a chaotic situation, began the inter-
ventions that changed the economy into a mix of private enterprise and
public programs. Banking crises and price declines were quickly
remedied, but unemployment endured and became the focus of renewed
fears in the sharp recession of 1937-38. These fears carried over
World War II and led to passage of the Employment Act of 1946 as a
guarantee of future prosperity.

The Birth of the Mixed Economy
The United States enjoyed its greatest prosperity in the years of
the Mixed Economy. It had its origins in the Great Depression, gained
its official credentials at the end of World War II, and matured with a
generation that never really experienced hard times. Over the years
developments in both the domestic and the international scene so
modified the goals and methods of government intervention that the
solution of the 1930s were largely forgotten. A reminder of the
Depression from which the Mixed Economy came into being is therefore in
order.
As the economy pursued its downward course from 1929 to 1933,
devastation was increasingly evident, and the only hope for improvement
seemed to lie in action by the federal government. President Roosevelt
took up the challenge immediately on coming into office and began the
series of interventions that eventually made the government's par-
ticipation large enough so that the economy could no longer be con-
sidered private free enterprise but a mixture of private and public
components. It came to be assumed that neither business nor government
would dominate the other but the two, in a kind of tacit partnership,
would resolve all economic problems to promote growth and maintain
prosperity.
In contrast, during the prosperity of the 1920s, the prevailing
view was that the government neither could nor should try to determine
the course of economic activity. The government was then small. After
dropping back from the highs of World War I, federal expenditures held
fairly steady at a rate of about $3 billion a year, and higher receipts
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produced budget surpluses averaging moderately less than a billion a
year. The gross national product (GNP) rose steadily from $86 billion
in 1923 to $104 billion in 1929, and the implicit price deflator stood
at the same level in both years. Industrial production and employment
also rose with only minor hesitations to the full employment peak of
1929. Unemployment of 1.6 million was 3.2 percent of a labor force
much more heavily engaged in cyclical industries than in recent decades.
The surging prosperity was fueled by pent-up demands from World War
I and by dynamic factors special to the decade. One legacy of the war
was an acute housing shortage. This pushed residential building to the
boom rates that prevailed from 1923 to 1928, with a peak of one million
units in 1925; it converted housing shortage to surplus. The maturing
automobile and related industries such as iron and steel, rubber, and
petroleum refining boomed to dominate manufacturing. State and local
governments undertook tremendous road-building programs designed to
satisfy the needs of the newly motoring public. Another new industry,
radio, built sets for almost every household and required large invest-
ments in facilities by the broadcasters. It was indeed a prosperity to
be proud of, and in the character of such booms it succeeded in accumu-
lating the many durable goods and facilities desired by a rapidly
growing population.
Gains from a soaring stock market encouraged belief in a "New Era"
of never-ending prosperity. This speculative market may itself be
Data are from Historical Statistics of the United States
,
Washington, D.C. , 1960.
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regarded as a specific phase of the overall business cycle following
World War I; it carried most of the fervor of that period as financial
assets were accumulated but was limited in comparison with the many
forms of speculation that developed after World War II. The illusions
generated by the market's success in blowing up stock prices were shat-
2
tered by the Great Crash in October, 1929. The government was not
prepared and indeed was not considered to have responsibility for
dealing either with the immediate speculative panic or the more basic
economic conditions that were emerging.
Cyclical Forces Caused the Depression
There is a tendency to think of the stock market crash as the cause
of the depression. Contrary to this dubious thesis, the primary lines
of causation run the other way. No doubt the heavy losses suffered by
speculators and financial firms made some contributions to the subse-
quent economic decline. However, only a small proportion of the popula-
3tion was actively involved in the speculation, and the shock effects
on the real economy were very brief. The latter, upon which the justi-
fication of speculators' hopes rested, had already turned down and
probably would have continued down without regard to any speculative
losses.
Even as peak stock prices were being approached, basic economic
variables were declining. Residential construction initiated the
2
J. K. Galbraih, The Great Crash 1929 , Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston,
1961.
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cyclical declines; it had been falling gradually from the 1925 peak and
the decline greatly accelerated in 1929. Community facilities followed,
starting down in 1928. Manufacturing production, led by steel and
autos, peaked in June 1929 and was down 7 percent by early October. In
contrast, during the third quarter of 1929, the Dow-Jones Index of
industrial stocks surged another 20 percent above the inflated highs
reached earlier in the year. That last great push was clearly a specu-
lative mistake based on unjustified hopes for continued progress and
profits, and the economy let the speculators down.
Contributing to the panic of the crash was the fact that most of
the speculative stock accounts were carrying their assets on small
margins, so holdings were sold regardless of price as owners' equities
were wiped out. Intervention by the big bankers produced enough support
by noon to halt the panic of that day, but this was not known generally
for hours because the ticker reporting was far behind the market. The
final big blow of the Crash occurred October 29, with almost half of
the peak values wiped out, but except for a brief credit crunch in the
following weeks, there was hardly any significant effect on the banks
or monetary conditions in general.
The most severe panic of stock market selling, unrelieved by inter-
vention, came much later. By the spring of 1930 the market had recovered
almost half of the loss in the 1929 crash. But then, as business condi-
tions worsened, the bear market resumed and in steady setbacks, eroded
away almost 90 percent of the peak Dow-Jones Industrial Index values by
the spring of 1932. In addition, needs for payment of debt and at-
tempts to gain liquidity resulted in sales of corporate bond holdings
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at sacrifice prices, so that the yields obtained by buyers doubled over
the same period. This erosion of security values was much more impor-
tant than the initial crash in creating insolvencies of investors and
in aggravating the banking crises that persisted into 1933.
Behind the financial failures lay the even more serious, almost
steady drops in the nonfinancial economy. Although financial stability
returned within weeks after the 1929 market crash, the economic decline
was accelerating. At the lows, the real declines were unprecedented:
In 1933 housing starts were down 90 percent; industrial fixed investment
and passenger car purchases were down about 70 percent; and the rever-
sal of inventories from accumulation in 1929 to liquidation in 1932
amounted to a third of the decline in the flow of goods to final users
4
in the same period. Employment fell from 47.6 million in 1929 to 38.8
million in 1933, and unemployment rose from 1.6 million to 12.8 million,
so that approximately one in four of the labor force were without jobs.
Two other factors added to the deflationary impact. The first was
the decline in prices. The wholesale price index began to fall in the
summer of 1929, and the decline accelerated as production dropped
reaching almost 40 percent by early 1933. This helped turn profits
into losses and although costs were also depressed it added to the
distress of bankruptcies, other business closures, and loss of employ-
ment. The second was the drying up of foreign trade. Protectionism
4
As shown in the author's book, Economic Forecasting (McGraw-Hill,
N.Y.
, 1958) each of the declines in these real variables can be effec-
tively explained in terms of their own stock-flow relationships. See
pp. 320, 348, 377, and 253.
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was strengthened with the passage of the Hawley-Smoot Tariffs in 1930,
thus adding another restriction to overall demand in already falling
world markets. U.S. exports, upon which the need for investment in
productive facilities partly depends, fell by 70 percent from 1929 to
1933, adding to the surpluses of capacity and labor.
Almost every economic variable joined in depressing the economy.
Yet the effects of such factors as money, prices, and trade were secon-
dary and laggard in propelling the economy into the depths. The price
declines were related to and largely derivative from the real declines
for two reasons: first prices in those days varied much more closely
in response to changes in real demand than they do now; and second,
declines in the physical volume of sales made goods on hand and the
facilities for producing them redundant and thus forced the repricing
of inventories and other assets that owners in financial difficulties
could no longer retain. The essence of this most violent economic set-
back, was the extreme conjuncture of real cyclical downswings in an
uncontrolled economy.
It follows that no particular person or group was responsible for
the disaster. Some blame President Hoover. They regard his actions as
no more than futile gestures aimed at restoring confidence. To him,
the government was a proper instrument for protection of political and
legal goals but limited in the economic sphere. He could not believe
that the economy lacked the vigor to make an automatic comeback. Much
less could he understand, given the state of business cycle theory at
the time, the dangers of a cumulative downswing, in which interacting
cyclical forces would work vigorously to drive the economy lower and
prevent recovery, just as they had worked for the earlier progress.
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Others, notably M. Friedman and A. J. Schwartz, blame the Federal
Reserve Board. The main thesis of their work, that "money does matter,"
is accepted by everybody, but their conclusion that the Great Contraction
was caused by monetary ineptitude is not really tenable. It ignores
the most important realities of those years of international deflation
and conceals the basic causal relations revealed in the timing of rele-
vant changes. Their argument as to the importance of money depends for
much of its plausibility on selecting and discussing the facts in terms
of the entire decline from 1929 to 1933 without regard to the
intermediate sequences. It is true that over the four years of
decline from 1929 to 1933, the money stock dropped by about one-third.
But through the first half of that period it remained almost stable
while everything else was plunging into the depths.
They concede that "In October 1930 ... the public was not greatly
concerned about the safety of bank deposits." And it was not until
some months after the banks then began to fail that the money stock
gained significance. In contrast to the nearly stable money stock, by
the end of 1930, housing starts were down about 60 percent, real
industrial gross investment was down about 40 percent, and the change
in business inventories was negative by more than the peak rate of
accumulation in 1929. The real cycles had set the course toward the
trough and the decline continued despite comparative monetary stability
A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 . Princeton
University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, N.J. 1963.
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Ibid., p. 340. See their charts 27, 28 and 29 for the courses of
some relevant variables.
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into the fall of 1931. After that the collapse of the money stock,
reflected all kinds of bankruptcies, especially bank failures.
Already by the spring of 1931, the relatively stable stock of money
had clearly become excessive in relation to economic activity and
prices. With activity low and still declining, it was completely unable
to stimulate spending by either consumers or business. Whether any
moderate addition to the stock of money could have been an inflationary
success in the deflationary atmosphere of the time is not at all
likely. Currency and near cash assets were being hoarded, including
hoarding by the banks trying to increase their reserves, so spending
was curtailed and the velocity of circulation fell. That decline, as
it occurred strongly in that early period, was not a monetary matter
but the reverse; production and prices were declining, so income had to
be falling, and since the money stock was relatively stable, it meant
both that velocity was falling and that the money stock had little to
do with initiating the decline. So money too was in need of downward
adjustment and the banking crisis was left to do the job.
Later, as bank deposits were wiped out in swelling waves of
failures, the decline in the money stock became a factor aggravating
the depth of the depression, but then it was too late for anything but
drastic general action to save the banks. In the quarter century since
the publication of their book, Friedman and Schwartz have insisted that
changes in the quantity of money have definite effects, after variable
lags, on economic activity and prices, but in the Great Contraction,
the situation was not one in which money took the lead, nor could it
have taken the lead to recovery.
-9-
No doubt, if the bank failures of late 1930 to early 1933 could have
been prevented, the disaster might have been moderated. Such a policy
seems plausible with the aid of hindsight and in the theory of the mixed
economy but neither the outcome nor the theory existed at the time. The
Fed was not committed to bailing out all the failing banks, no matter
how badly they were managed or how much their portfolios had deteriorated.
The bankers themselves accepted no responsibility for the salvation of
their fellows; they refused to participate in a merger plan to save the
Bank of the United States at the onset of the first banking crisis in
the fall of 1930.
High-powered money, the Fed's direct responsibility, was permitted
only a minor decline to that point. Thereafter it rose and ended the
entire contraction about one-sixth above the 1929 level in early 1933.
The Fed clearly was willing to help via the discount window. All
through 1930, it lowered the discount rate in steps, to 2.5 percent,
half the level of pre-Crash 1929, and then to 1.5 percent in the spring
of 1931, but an unresponsive economy gave it little cooperation.
The low interest rates and ample excess reserves prevailing in the
years following the Depression lows led to the situation described by
the "pushing on a string" theory: "You can't move the far end of a
string by pushing on the near end!" In other words, making money avail-
able and cheap was impotent for bringing about the desired recovery.
Borrowing fell to a low ebb because hardly anybody could expect to pro-
fit by taking a loan. Both lenders and borrowers preferred as far as
possible to reduce debt, and private debt made hardly any recovery from
the banking-crisis declines until after 1940. Paying off debt or
-10-
writing it off as bad debt was the way the money stock in the form of
bank deposits was brought down. It was a result much more than a cause
of the Depression.
The Beginnings of Intervention
Roosevelt came into office facing a chaotic situation. The growth
of radicalism over "the failure of the capitalist system" made condi-
tions frightening in socio-political as well as in economic terms. The
decline ended when he took office as President and initiated the acti-
vist programs known as the New Deal. That his success was partly coin-
cidental may be conceded; some important investment activities such as
residential construction had then hit bottom, near zero, so that de-
flationary pressure was reduced. Nevertheless, the importance of the
measures taken should not be discounted.
The programs were ad hoc and welfare seeking, focused on the needs
of particular disadvantaged groups. There was no accepted economic
theory to direct them; they represented in effect a general role of
fighting the fires generated by the Depression wherever they had flared
to intolerable heat. Any group who needed help could expect to be
heard, and the multiple programs undertaken were variously derived from
their pleas or from the proposals of experts who were presumed to have
special knowledge relating to the problems perceived.
It turned out that the easiest problem to resolve was the banking
crisis, though not without pain to many troubled bankers still operating
On March 6, 1933, all the banks were ordered closed for a nation-wide
"holiday." Their accounts were then to be inspected and only "sound"
banks were to be permitted to reopen. Emergency legislation was passed
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on March 9 to permit the issue of Federal Reserve notes against holdings
of federal securities, and the Fed announced that currency would be
provided to meet any run on a reopened bank. Deposit insurance began
to be discussed and after several months was put into effect. These
measures restored confidence in the deposits of operating banks, so
recovery could get under way in an atmosphere of monetary calm.
Halting the downward price spiral was also accomplished quickly.
It came to an end even before formal action was taken, as soon as the
intention to do so was announced in 1933. Even industries with the
greatest resistance to price cutting had been unable to cope as volume
dried up and the mechanisms of price administration broke down. The
industrialists came to Washington to join farmers and small businessmen
in the clamor for help. The price recovery program set up, the National
Recovery Administration, was widely publicized as the "Blue Eagle." It
was in effect an experiment in monopolistic price fixing, with govern-
ment participation protecting firms that had been restrained by the
antitrust laws. Codes were set up, industry by industry, in consulta-
tion between industry and government representatives, to lift prices,
which were then able to hold the early gains until the next upward push
in 1936. In addition, production, wages, and investment were to be
adjusted as necessary to meet this primary goal.
The effects of higher prices and wages might have been altogether
negative in this period of low demand except that a short-lived inven-
tory boomlet was stimulated, providing some temporary hopes for complete
success. This boomlet was mostly over by the end of 1933, completely
by mid-1934, when liquidation of inventories resumed. A year later the
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Supreme Court declared the program unconstitutional, and its potentially
harmful effects were eliminated.
As part of the Blue Eagle program, business nominally accepted
labor's right to collective bargaining and agreed to minimum wages and
maximum hours. Labor had become militant and the unions' organizing
and recruiting drives greatly expanded their membership. The early
concessions to their point of view were extended and formalized with
the passage of legislation—the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
(the Wagner Act) and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. These later
measures reforming labor relations and giving the workers a stronger
voice in economic decision making, as well as most of the other liberal
Q
New Deal measures, met intense business opposition.
The condition that proved least answerable to correction was un-
employment. To reduce it, public works spending was expanded and
several programs of direct federal employment were undertaken. The
youth program known as the CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps) took young
men out of the labor market and away from home to work on improving the
environment; it employed a half million in the summer of 1935. For
adults, the most successful was the WPA (Works Progress Administration),
a work relief program that operated through projects set up under state
and local auspices in conformity with federal standards. It employed
relief applicants with a very wide range of skills, including building
tradesmen, artists and writers as well as many others. They were paid
Thomas Wilson, Fluctuations in Income and Employment , Pitman,
NY, 1942, p. 174.
o
Milton Derber, The American Idea of Industrial Democracy, 1865-
1965
,
U of II Press, Urbana, 1970, p. 296.
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wages higher than relief payments but usually much less than the wages
earned in similar private employment. Beginning in the spring of 1935,
WPA employment was expanded rapidly to reach a total of 3 million
workers in early 1936. This not only made a substantial contribution
to recovery, it also created or improved public facilities and gave a
strong boost to the morale of the unemployed.
The expansion of programs was the most important government contri-
bution to recovery, but the consequent large deficits in the federal
budget were widely deplored throughout the 1930s. At that time budget
balancing was still central doctrine in the theory of government
finance. The first deficit appeared in 1931, with the decline in
revenues, and the first big increase in income taxes was passed in
1932, before Roosevelt, to restore tax receipts; in many brackets,
rates were more than doubled and in others nearly doubled, but the
decline in receipts was barely stemmed. The Revenue Act of 1934
increased rates further, and the Act of 1936 put some of the rates up
still further, mostly in the $50,000 and higher brackets, with the
result that Roosevelt was damned for his "soak the rich" policy. Up to
that point at least, he too believed in balanced budgets but he was
never able to achieve any in his long term in office, as the relatively
small deficits of the 1930s grew into the multifold deficits of World
War II.
The recovery in income and personal consumption expenditures acce-
lerated in 1935 and was given a fillip in early 1936 with the payment
of the veterans' bonus, passed over Roosevelt's veto. Encouraged by
this upswing and by the ability to raise prices to cover costs and
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increase profits, business embarked on a strong movement to accumulate
inventories. In 1937 some variables made recoveries all the way back
to the 1929 highs, and although others fell short and the full
employment condition of 1929 was clearly missed, it was then thought
that the economy was vigorous enough to take care of itself. So
government policy changed in the latter part of 1936 and programs were
cut back sharply; for example, WPA employment was reduced from the 1936
high of 3 million to 1.5 million by the fall of 1937. The cutbacks
combined with tax increases to produce a strong deflationary impact.
Thus, the recession of 1937-38 partly grew out of efforts to reduce
spending and deficits.
In early 1937 business policy also changed. It became clear that
income and consumption had not risen enough to justify the then current
rate of production, so the inventory cycle went into reverse. Taking
account of peaks and troughs within the years, production was cut back
in one year by about as much as it had been cut in the first two years
of decline from the 1929 high to the level of 1931, and unemployment
again rose by some 3.5 million to about 11 million, or roughly one-fifth
of the labor force. This sharp decline ended by mid-1938.
It was also clear to government by then that the negative change in
policy in 1936 had been a mistake, so it was again changed toward
restoring economic stimulation. Again using WPA as an indicator, pro-
ject employment was increased from the 1937 low of 1.5 million to over
3 million by the end of 1938. Recovery was resumed, and in the fall of
1939, with about 10 million still unemployed, merged into the beginning
of the expansion based on war in Europe.
-15-
From Setback to Guaranteeing the Future
The failure of the economy to complete the recovery and instead to
plunge into the drastic setback of 1937-38 called for explanation.
Lauchlin Currie, then Assistant Director of Research at the Federal
Reserve Board, pointed out that the shift in government policy had been
9
an important factor in the recession. He had developed a measure of the
economic effects of fiscal policy, called the net government contribu-
tion, which was essentially the excess of disposable cash income paid
to the public over the cash tax revenues collected from the public.
Program cuts and tax increases reduced this measure from over $4 billion
in 1936 to almost zero in 1937. Taxes had been increasing with higher
incomes and tax rates, and the imposition of the Social Security taxes
at the beginning of 1937 made this decline particularly abrupt. Currie
also saw, though without current data on inventories, that business had
overshot the upswing and so had made another major contribution to the
recession. The memorandum was a masterpiece of economic analysis for
the time and had an important impact on policy.
By that time J. M. Keynes' General Theory of Employment, Interest,
and Money had become widely available. It explained in terms of rates
of saving and investment how the economy as a whole worked and provided
the basic form of analysis that has dominated economics ever since.
Keynes had been particularly concerned to explain the long continued
condition of unemployment in England in the 1920s and 1930s, and the
applicability of his theory to the problem in the U.S. was clear. His
9„
Causes of the Recession April, 1938, History of Political
Economy
,
Vol. 12, No. 3, 1980, Department of Economics, Duke University,
Durham, NC
,
pp. 316-335.
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book. soon became a kind of bible for economists in both universities
and government. Many, too numerous to mention here, made contributions
extending and explaining the new theory for the benefit of national
policy.
In May 1939, Professor Alvin Hansen of Harvard and Lauchlin Currie
explained the new theory and its implications in Hearings before the
Temporary National Economic Committee of the US Congress. They made
elaborations based on their own research and presented statistics to
justify recommendations of active federal measures to push the economy
higher.
In the hearings Hansen stressed the lagging of investment, espe-
cially construction expenditures, as compared with the 1920s. In his
view dynamic factors were no longer operating. The rate of population
increase had dwindled to a fraction of what it had been and no new
industry was in sight to provide thrust to capital expenditures. The
boom of the 1920s had produced a state of saturation and the economy,
subsequently failing to find adequate investment outlets for its
savings, was "depressed and stagnant." He did not consider this in
the context of a longer cycle in which the extreme durability of the
products of construction could preserve for some years a state of
saturation that would eventually be eliminated by slow growth and by
the wearing out and obsolescence of facilities. He sought only to
demonstrate that for the time being the economy could not progress on
its own and needed outside stimulation to regain prosperity.
Investigations of Concentration of Economic Power. Part 9
Savings and Investment
,
TNEC, Washington, D.C., p. 3503.
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An alternative kind of theory concerned political controversy.
Although Roosevelt saved the free enterprise system, he was hated by
the wealthy, not because he did so but because he demanded payment for
doing so—in higher taxes and in the sharing of economic power. Some
analysts and commentators held that his policies in the 1930s were so
controversial as to result in a "poisoned political atmosphere," so
much so as to retard the economy. There are elements of truth in these
statements but the idea that controversy and political frustration as
such interfered substantially with economic progress by discouraging
investment is not well founded. Business responded fully to market
demands in both output and investment. The various forms of investment
rose as fast as basic factors in the 1936 situation called for and
generally exceeded the related levels in 1937, in accordance with the
lags involved.
On the basis of the Depression experience and the new economic
theory, three conclusions were established.
First, government spending and deficits (dissaving) were necessary
whenever the private economy was in the doldrums; there was no alterna-
tive to active measures for minimizing the economic, social, and poli-
tical consequences of a severe decline.
Second, the theory of pump-priming was fallacious; when a temporary
stimulus is withdrawn, the economy drops back, lagging briefly on the
decline as on the upswing.
Third, in a condition of stagnation, the economy cannot progress to
new recovery highs, let alone full employment, without some stimulus
11
Economic Forecasting . See charts on pp. 252, 349, 351, 353, and
356.
-18-
long lasting and strong enough to spark private investment at a rate
that would absorb the savings generated by prosperity incomes.
These ideas carried over World War II into the postwar period. The
war itself could be considered a kind of temporary stimulus that would
be eliminated at its end. Fears of a recurrence of depressed con-
ditions characterized by huge unemployment were widespread. The war
effort had absorbed the unemployed—a major asset in building the armed
forces—and an even larger number were being discharged to civilian
life in little more than a year. Since jobs for them would not be
immediately available, unemployment would rise sharply. There were
forecasts of a return to the 8 to 10 million unemployed of the imme-
diate prewar period.
A popular economic concept at the time was the "deflationary gap."
This concept is theoretically valid as a measure of the structural
excess of saving over investment opportunities in the circumstances it
contemplated—namely, a "less than full employment equilibrium." It
indicated that, given the distribution of income, savings would be too
high and investment too low to produce or sustain the full employment
rate of activity. It correctly assumed that real investment derives
mainly from its own determinants, and not from an independent level of
savings. It incorrectly assumed that opportunities for real invest-
ment in the postwar years would be too restricted to develop the
volume needed to match a full employment volume of savings.
The negative attitudes were not confined to government and other
economists. Business too was in a pessimistic mood. It had been
geared up to wartime production above the level of normal capacity and
-19-
knew that a letdown could leave it with excess capacity. An illustra-
tion of business reluctance to spend for investments other than recon-
12
version was provided by the controversy over future steel requirements.
Disturbed by uncertainties about future sales and prices, the industry
was unwilling to invest in new capacity for several years. In the
summer of 1946 the stock market broke sharply, at a time when produc-
tion was recovering and prices were being decontrolled, and the market
stayed at the reduced level for three years. This was proved to be a
costly speculative misjudgment by the financial community during the
multifold advance of the market in the 1950s and 1960s.
At the time, few economists foresaw other than a return to depressed
conditions. The author did not believe such a conclusion was justi-
fied. He wrote two articles pointing to the enormous accumulation of
liquid assets from wartime saving and the corresponding near absence
of debt, on the unprecedented deferred demands for houses and durable
goods, and on the consumer demands of a rapidly increasing civilian
13population. Both of these articles received some sharp criticism:
it was not just that they were thought to be mistaken; more signifi-
cantly, some critics considered them inappropriate for supporting
sound national policy.
12
Memorandum prepared by Louis H. Bean, U.S. Department of Agri-
culture, June, 1948, partly reproduced in Economic Forecasting
,
p. 71-2,
13
The first article, "Consumer Expenditures in War and Transition,"
appeared in the Review of Economic Statistics
,
Vol. 28, No. 3, August,
1946. The second, "No Bust in 1947," Department of Commerce, March
1947, had relevant portions republished in Barron's
,
April 21, 1947
under the title "Consumer Buying Still Going Up."
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On the side of playing safe against depression conditions were the
attitudes engendered by success in winning the war. There was a new
sense of power, new confidence in the government's ability to accomplish
great things, and a determination to do whatever was necessary to pro-
vide for a prosperous future. These views were expressed by Roosevelt
14
in October 1944. They met the usual skepticism for campaign speeches,
but in the event there was no incentive to refuse new opportunities
for business or employment.
The perspective of these attitudes was global in scope. At the end
of the war the United States economy alone was undamaged and capable of
full industrial production. The United Nations was then being organized,
on the basis of earlier discussions initiated by Roosevelt, and inter-
national cooperation to meet emergency needs abroad was begun under a
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). Subsequently the use
of United States resources for foreign aid was greatly expanded and
refocused toward Europe under the Marshall Plan for assisting friendly
countries in repairing war devastation and promotiong their full
recovery.
The expected letdown in 1946-47 was brief. For a variety of
reasons—mainly because the returning veterans did not immediately want
or need to enter the labor market and hunt for jobs—the predicted high
unemployment did not make its appearance. But before the issue was
decided by facts, action to guarantee the economic future at home was
14
See Henry Wallace, Sixty Million Jobs , Sept., 1945, p. 8. This
book was a systematic attempt to state goals and the means of realizing
them, with a call for cooperation in all sectors of the economy.
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taken in the form of the Employment Act of 1946. It committed the
government to creating favorable economic conditions and "to promote
maximum employment, production and purchasing power."
The Mixed Economy was alive and active. It grew to maturity in
decades of progress interrupted by only minor recessions. Unfor-
tunately both the goals and the particular patterns of expenditure were
modified and distorted by involvement in the Cold War. Each in a
series of emergencies, two being minor hot wars, demanded a surge in
expenditures directed away from the needs of the home economy. Before
the second of these wars, not much after the first decade of the mixed
economy, President Eisenhower felt it necessary to warn against the
growing power of the military-industrial complex.
The government apparently lived up to its commitment fully, but
each time its efforts to promote recovery from a minor setback required
greater intervention, business left it to carry a greater share of the
fiscal burden. The impact was aggravated by growing acceptance of the
mistaken theory that tax reduction is the best stimulus for economic
growth and by the expansion of multiple tax shelters. These trends
have created huge and potentially destabilizing federal deficits under
President Reagan.
The result is an economy in delicate balance. The inflationary
policies of the government, both fiscal and monetary, are balancing for
the time being the deflationary forces of market and debt saturation,
an overvalued dollar, and high interest rates. Deregulation is helping
to return the economy to the uncontrolled state that existed in the
1920s, and the Administration is condoning the growth of monopoly power
-22-
through mergers. So the Mixed Economy may be nearing an end, with
unforeseeable consequences, not just for the economy but for the entire
socio-political system.
V Lewis Bassie
Professor Emeritus of Economics
University of Illinois
May, 1985
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